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VII. *Essay on the Philosophy of the Hindus. Part II.* By HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE, Esq. Director R. A. S. F. R. S. &c. &c.

Read February 21, 1824.

In the preceding essay, the *Sānc'hya*, theistical as well as atheistical, was examined. The subject of the present essay, will be the dialectic philosophy of GÓTAMA, and atomical of CANÁDE, respectively called *Nyāya* "reasoning," and *Vaiśéshica* "particular." The first, as its title implies, is chiefly occupied with the metaphysics of logic; the second with physics: that is, with "particulars" or sensible objects: and hence its name. They may be taken generally, as parts of one system: supplying each other's deficiencies: commonly agreeing upon such points as are treated by both: yet on some differing; and therefore giving origin to two schools, the *Naiyáyica*, and *Vaiśéshica*.

From these have branched various subordinate schools of philosophy; which, in the ardor of scholastic disputation, have disagreed on matters of doctrine or of interpretation. The ordinary distinction between them is that of ancients and moderns; besides appellations derived from the names of their favourite authors, as will be more particularly noticed in another place.

The text of GÓTAMA is a collection of *sútras* or succinct aphorisms, in five books or "lectures;" each divided into two "days" or diurnal lessons; and these again subdivided into sections or articles, termed *pracarāñas*, as relating to distinct topics. It is a maxim, that a section is not to consist of so little as a single *sútra*; and to make good the rule, some stress is occasionally put upon the text; either splitting an aphorism, or associating it incongruously.

CANÁDE's collection of *sútras* is comprised in ten lectures, similarly divided into two daily lessons, and these into *pracarāñas*, or sections, containing two or more *sútras*, relative to the same topic.

Like the text of other sciences among the *Hindus*, the *sútras* of GÓTAMA and of CANÁDE have been explained and annotated by a triple set of commentaries, under the usual titles of *Bhāshya*, *Vārtica*, and *Tíká*. These (the *Bhāshya* especially) are repeatedly cited by modern commentators, as well as by writers of separate treatises; but (so far as has come under my

immediate notice) without naming the authors; and I cannot adventure, having no present opportunity of consulting the original scholia in a collective form, to assign them to their proper authors, from recollection of former researches.

They are of high authority, and probably of great antiquity: and it frequently becomes a question with the later commentators, whether a particular passage is to be taken for a *sūtra* and part of the text, or for a gloss of the ancient scholiast.

Commentaries, which are now at hand, and which have been consulted in the course of preparing the present treatise, are the *Vārtica-tātparyā-pariśudd'hi* of the celebrated UDAYANĀCHĀRYA; and the *Vārtica-tātparyā-ticā* of the, no less celebrated VĀCHESPATI-MIŚRA. The more modern scholia of VIŚWANĀTHA upon GÓTAMA's text, and SANCARA-MIŚRA upon CANĀDE's, are those to which most frequent reference has been made, for the present purpose.

Separate treatises of distinguished authors teach, and amply discuss, the elements of the science. Such are the *Nyāya-līlāvati* of BALLABHA-ĀCHĀRYA, following chiefly CANĀDE's system.

An easier, and more concise, introduction, than these abstruse and voluminous works afford, is found requisite to the initiatory study of the science. One of the most approved elementary treatises is the *Tarca-bhāṣhā* of CÉŚAVA-MIŚRA, author of many other tracts. Though adapted to the comprehension of the learner without the aid of a gloss, it has nevertheless employed the labour of many commentators, expounding and illustrating it. Among others may be named, in order of seniority, GÓVERD'HANA-MIŚRA in the *Tarca-bhāṣhā-pracāsa*; GAURÍCĀNTA (author likewise of the *Sadyucti-muktāvalī*) in the *Bhāvart'ha-dīpicā*; MĀD'HAVADÉVA (author of the *Nyāya-sāra*) in the *Tarca-bhāṣhā-sāra-manjarī*; besides RĀMALINGA-CŔITI in the *Nyāya-sangraha*, whose relative antiquity is less certain; and BALIBHADRA, who is known to me only from GAURÍCĀNTA's citations.

Another compendious introduction to the study of Indian logic is the *Padārt'ha-dīpicā* by CÓNDA-BHATTA, a noted grammarian, author of the *Vaiyācarāṇa-bhūṣhaṇa* on the philosophy of grammatical structure. It does not appear to have had any commentator; and it needs none.

Metrical treatises, or memorial verses, comprising the elements of the science, bear the ordinary denomination of *Cāricā*. A work of this description is the *Cusumānjali*, with its commentary, by NĀRAYĀNA-TĪRT'HA; an-

other, which likewise is expounded by its author, is the *Nyāya-saṁcshépa* of GÓVINDA-BHATTÁCHÁRYA.

Elementary works only have been here spoken of. Distinct treatises, on divers branches of the whole subject, and on various emergent topics, are innumerable. No department of science, or literature, has more engaged the attention of the Hindus, than the *Nyāya*; and the fruit of their lucubrations has been an infinity of volumes, among which are compositions of very celebrated schoolmen.

The order observed both by GÓTAMA and by CANÁDE, in delivering the precepts of the science which they engage to unfold, is that which has been intimated in a passage of the *Védas*, cited in the *Bhāshya*, as requisite steps of instruction and study: viz. enunciation, definition, and investigation. Enunciation, (*uddéśa*) is the mention of a thing by its name; that is, by a term signifying it, as taught by revelation: for language is considered to have been revealed to man. Definition, (*lacshaṇa*) sets forth a peculiar property, constituting the essential character of a thing. Investigation, (*parīcshā*) consists in disquisition upon the pertinence and sufficiency of the definition. Consonantly to this, the teachers of philosophy premise the terms of the science; proceed to the definitions; and then pass on to the examination of subjects so premised.

In a logical arrangement the “predicaments” (*padārtha*), or “objects of proof,” are six; as they are enumerated by CANÁDE;\* viz. substance, quality, action, community, particularity, and aggregation or intimate relation: to which a seventh is added by other authors; privation or negation.† Thus augmented, they compose a two-fold arrangement, positive and negative, (*bhāva* and *abhāva*) the first comprising six, the latter one.‡

The *Baudd’has*, or followers of BUDD’HA, are said to identify the predicaments with knowledge (*jnyāna*); and according to the *Védāntis*, who are pantheists, the predicaments are identified with the universal being (*Brahme*) in whom all exists.§

Other categories are alleged by different authorities; as power or energy (*śakti*); similarity or resemblance (*sādrīśya*); and many more. But the logicians of this school acknowledge but six; or at most seven, above-mentioned.

\* C. 1. 3.

† *Pad. Dīp.* 1.

‡ *Tarc. Bhāsh.* 1.

§ *Tarc. Bhāsh.* and *N. Sang.* 2. 4.

GÓTAMA enumerates sixteen heads or topics: among which, proof or evidence, and that which is to be proven, are chief; and the rest are subsidiary or accessory, as contributing to knowledge and ascertainment of truth. Disputation being contemplated in this arrangement, several among these heads relate to controversial discussion. They are, 1st. proof; 2d. that which is to be known and proven; 3d. doubt; 4th. motive; 5th. instance; 6th. demonstrated truth; 7th. member of a regular argument or syllogism; 8th. reasoning by reduction to absurdity; 9th. determination or ascertainment; 10th. thesis or disquisition; 11th. controversy; 12th. objection; 13th. fallacious reason; 14th. perversion; 15th. futility; 16th. confutation.\*

The difference between these two arrangements is not considered to amount to discrepancy. They are held to be reconcilable: the one more ample, the other more succinct; but both leading to like results.

The *Sānc'hya* philosophy, as shewn in a former essay, affirms two eternal principles, soul and matter; (for *pracrīti* or nature, abstracted from modifications, is no other than matter :) and reckoning, with these two permanent principles, such as are transient, they enumerate twenty-five.

The *Nyāya*, as well as the *Sānc'hya*, concur with other schools of psychology, in promising beatitude, or (*nīśréyas*) final excellence, and (*mócsha*) deliverance from evil, for the reward of a thorough knowledge of the principles which they teach; that is, of truth; meaning the conviction of the soul's eternal existence separable from body.

Soul then, as the *Bhāshya* affirms, is that which is to be known and proven. GÓTAMA, however, enumerates under this head, besides soul, its associate body, the external senses, things or the objects of sense, (that is, the elements, and his followers here take occasion to introduce CANADE'S six categories), intellect or understanding, mind or the eternal organ, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit or consequence of deeds, pain or physical evil, and lastly, liberation; making, together with soul, twelve (*praméya*) objects of proof, being topics of knowledge requisite for deliverance.

I. Evidence or proof (*pramāna*) by which those objects are known and demonstrated, is of four kinds: perception; inference of three sorts, (con-

sequent, antecedent, and analogous); comparison, and affirmation (comprehending tradition, as well as revelation). Inference *à priori* concludes an effect from its cause; inference *à posteriori* deduces a cause from its effect: another ground of inference is analogy. Or one sort is direct and affirmative; another indirect or negative; and the third is both direct and indirect.

Proof (*pramāṇa*) is defined to be the efficient or especial cause of actual knowledge: and this intends right notion (*anubhava*); exclusive, consequently, of wrong notion, as error, doubt, and reduction to absurdity; and likewise exclusive of memory: for notion (*anubhava*) is knowledge other than remembrance.

Cause (*kāraṇa*) is that which is efficacious, necessarily preceding an effect that cannot else be: and, conversely, effect (*cārya*) is that which necessarily ensues and could not else be.

For the relation of cause and effect, and for distinguishing different sorts of cause, connexion (*sambandha*) or relation, in general, must be considered. It is two-fold: simple conjunction (*sanyóga*), and aggregation or intimate and constant relation (*samavāya*); the latter being the connexion of things, whereof one, so long as they coexist, continues united with the other: for example, parts and that which is composed of them; as yarn and cloth: for so long as the yarn subsists, the cloth remains. Here the connexion of the yarn and cloth is intimate relation: but that of the loom is simple conjunction. Consonantly to this distinction, cause is intimate or direct, producing aggregation or an intimately relative effect, as clay of pottery, or yarn of cloth: or it is mediate or indirect, being proximate to the aggregating cause, as conjunction of yarn serving for the production of cloth: or thirdly, it is neither direct nor indirect, but instrumental or concomitant, as the loom. Of positive things there must be three causes; and the most efficacious is termed the chief or especial cause: of negative there is but one, which is the third abovementioned.

This would be the place for an ample discussion of the several sorts of proof abovementioned. But they are topics embracing too great a scope of disquisition in the Hindu philosophy, to be adequately considered within the limits of the present essay. The subject, therefore, is reserved for future consideration, in a connected view of it, with relation to the various Indian systems of philosophising, after they shall have been severally examined.

II. 1. The first and most important of twelve objects of evidence or matters to be proven, enumerated by GÓTAMA, is soul.\* It is the site of knowledge or sentiment : distinct from body and from the senses ; different for each individual coexistent person ; infinite ; eternal ; perceived by the mental organ ; and demonstrated by its peculiar attributes, intellect, &c. For knowledge, desire, aversion, volition, pain and pleasure, severally and collectively, argue the existence of soul : since these are not universal attributes, as number, quantity, &c. common to all substances ; but are peculiar and characteristic qualities, apprehended exclusively by one organ, as colour and other peculiar qualities are ; yet belonging not to apparent substances, as earth, and the rest ; and arguing therefore a distinct substratum, other than space, time and mind, to which universal, not peculiar, qualities appertain. That distinct substance, which is the substratum of those peculiar qualities, is the soul.

This concerns the living soul, (*Jivátmā*) the animating spirit of individual person. Souls then, as is expressly affirmed, are numerous. But the supreme soul (*Paramátmā*) is one : the seat of eternal knowledge ; demonstrated as the maker of all things.†

The individual soul is infinite ; for whithersoever the body goes, there the soul too is present. It experiences the fruit of its deeds ; pain or pleasure. It is eternal, because it is infinite : for whatever is infinite, is likewise eternal ; as the etherial element (*ácáśa*).

Being a substance, though immaterial, as a substratum of qualities, it is placed in CANÁDE's arrangement, as one of nine substances, which are there recognised.‡

It has fourteen qualities : viz. number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and faculty of imagination.

2. The second among matters to be proven in GÓTAMA's enumeration, is body. It is the site of effort ; of organs of sensation ; and of sentiment of pain or pleasure.§

It is an ultimate compound ; the seat of soul's enjoyment. It is a whole, composed of parts ; a framed substance, not inchoative : associated with

\* G. 1. 1. 3. 2. and 3. 1. 1—5. *Tarc. Bhāsh.* 2. 1.

† *Pad. Dīp.* 1. 8.

‡ G. 1.

§ G. 1. 1. 3. 3.

which, soul experiences fruition ; that is, immediate presence of pain or of pleasure, in relation to itself.

It is the site of effort ; not of motion simply ; but of action tending to the attainment of what is pleasing, and to the removal of what is displeasing.\*

It is earthly ; for the qualities of earth are perceived in it : (namely, smell, colour, solidity, &c.) and it is expressly pronounced so by more than one passage of the *Védas*. According to some opinions, it consists of three elements, earth, water, and light or heat : for the peculiar qualities of those elements are perceptible in it ; since it has smell, clamminess, and warmth : or it consists of four, since there is inspiration as well as expiration of air : or of five, as indicated by odour, moisture, digestion, breath, and cavities.† Those opinions are controverted by the *Nyáyā*. It consists not of five, nor of four, elements : else, as CANÁDE argues, it would be invisible ; for the union of visible with invisible objects is so : instance wind. Nor does it consist of three visible elements, nor of two : for there is no intimate inchoative union of heterogeneous substances.‡ This last reason is alleged likewise by CAPILA : heterogeneous materials cannot enter into the same composition.§

Besides human and other bodies of this world, all which are terrene, there are, in other worlds, aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies. In these, too, there is union with an element, for soul's fruition.||

Earthly body is two-fold ; sexually bred, or not so bred : the first is either viviparous or oviparous : the second results from concurrence of particles by an unseen or predestined cause, and peculiar disposition of atoms. That such beings are, is proved from authority of the *Védas*, which reveal creation of gods and demi-gods.

Or the distinction is between such as are propagated by sexes, or are otherwise generated. The latter comprehends equivocal generation of worms, nits, maggots, gnats, and other vermin, considered to be bred in sweat, or fermented filth ; and germination of plants sprouting from the ground. Accordingly, the distinct sorts of body are five : 1st. ungenerated ;

\* *Tarc. Bhāsh.* and *Com.*

† *G. 3. L. 6. 1—5.*

‡ *Can. 4. 2. 1. and Com.*

§ *Cap. 3. 16—18 and 5. 99.*

|| *Bhāshya on Gôt.*



2d. uterine or viviparous; 3d. oviparous; 4th. engendered in filth; 5th. vegetative or germinating.\*

3. Next, among objects of proof, are the organs of sensation. An organ of sense is defined as an instrument of knowledge: conjoined to the body, and imperceptible to the senses.†

There are five external organs: smell, taste, sight, touch, and hearing. They are not modifications of consciousness (as the *Sānc'hyas* maintain), but material, constituted of the elements, earth, water, light, air, and ether, respectively.‡

The pupil of the eye is not the organ of sight (as the *Baudd'has* affirm); nor is the outer ear, or opening of the auditory passage, the organ of hearing: but a ray of light, proceeding from the pupil of the eye towards the object viewed, is the visual organ; and ether, contained in the cavity of the ear, and communicating by intermediate ether with the object heard, is the organ of hearing. That ray of light is not ordinarily visible: just as the effulgence of a torch is unseen in meridian sunshine. But, under particular circumstances, a glimpse of the visual ray is obtained. For instance, in the dark, the eye of a cat or other animal prowling at night.

The organ of vision then is lucid; and in like manner, the organ of hearing is ethereal; and that of taste, aqueous (as saliva); and of feeling, aerial; and of smelling, earthly.

The site of the visual organ is the pupil of the eye; of the auditory organ, the orifice of the ear; of the olfactory organ, the nostril or tip of the nose; of the taste, the tip of the tongue; of the feeling, the skin.

Objects, apprehended by the senses, are odour, flavour, colour, touch (or temperature), and sound: which are qualities appertaining to earth, water, light, air, and ether.§

The existence of organs of sense is proved by inference, from the fact of the apprehension of those objects: for apprehension implies an instrument to effect it, since it is an act, in like manner as the act of cutting implies an instrument, as an axe, or a knife.

The organs are six, including an internal organ, termed *manas*, or mind: not five only, as the followers of BUDD'HA maintain, disallowing an internal

\* *Pad. Dīp.* and *Mādḥ.* on *Cés'*. † *Tarc. Bhāsh.*

‡ *Gôt.* 1. 1. 3. 4—5 and 3. 1. 7 and 8.

§ *Gôt.* 1. 1. 3. 6.

sense ; nor so many as eleven, which the *Sānc'hyas* affirm, comprehending, with the senses, the organs of action, which they reckon five.\*

Mind is the instrument, which effects the apprehension of pain, pleasure, or interior sensations ; and, by its union with external senses, produces knowledge of exterior objects apprehended through them, as colour, &c. but not independently of those senses, for outward objects.

Its existence is proved by singleness of sensation : since various sensations do not arise at one time to the same soul. They only seem to do so when passing rapidly, though successively ; as a firebrand, whirled with velocity, seems a ring of fire.

It is single ; that is, for each soul, one : not so many minds as there are external senses. When it is conjoined with any one of the outward organs, knowledge is received through that organ : when not so conjoined, none comes through that sense, but through any other with which it then is associated.†

It is not infinite, being imperceptible to the touch, like the ethereal element, as the *Mīmāṃsā* maintains;‡ but it is minutely small, as an atom. Were it infinite, it might be united with every thing at once ; and all sensations might be contemporaneous. It is imperceptible to sight, touch, and other senses, and is inferred from reasoning, as follows : There must be an instrument of apprehension of pain and pleasure ; which instrument must be other than the sight, or any external sense ; for pain and pleasure are experienced though sight be wanting. Such instrument of painful or pleasurable sensation is termed mind (*manas*).

It is eternal, and is distinct from soul, as well as from body : with which it is merely conjoined.

It is reckoned by CANÁDE among substances ; and is the substratum of eight qualities, none of which are peculiar to it, being all common to other substances : viz. number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, subsequence, and faculty.§

4. Next in GÓTAMA's arrangement are the (*art'ha*) objects of sense : that is, of the external senses : and he enumerates odour, taste, colour, feel, and sound, which are the peculiar qualities of earth, and the rest of the elements respectively.||

\* *Gau.* on *Cés'*.

† *Gót.* 1. 1. 3. 8. and 3. 2. 6.

‡ *Pad. Díp.*

§ *Gau.* on *Cés'*.

|| *Gót.* 1. 1. 3. 5.

Under this head, CÉSÁVA places the categories (*padárt'ha*) of CANÁDE : which are six ; substance, quality, &c.

I. Substance is the intimate cause of an aggregate effect or product : it is the site of qualities and of action ; or that, in which qualities abide ; and in which action takes place.\*

Nine are enumerated ; and no more are recognised. Darkness has been alleged by some philosophers ; but it is no substance ; nor is body a distinct one ; nor gold, which the *Mímánsacas* affirm to be a peculiar substance.

Those specified by CANÁDE are,

1. Earth, which, besides qualities common to most substances (as number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, gravity, fluidity, and faculty of velocity and of elasticity ;) has colour, savour, odour, and feel, or temperature. Its distinguishing quality is smell : and it is succinctly defined as a substance odorous.† In some instances, as in gems, the smell is latent : but it becomes manifest by calcination.

It is eternal, as atoms ; or transient, as aggregates. In either, those characteristic qualities are transitory, and are maturative, as affected by light and heat : for by union with it, whether latent or manifest, former colour, taste, smell, and temperature are in earth of any sort annulled, and other colour, &c. introduced.

Aggregates or products are either organised bodies, or organs of perception, or unorganic masses.

Organised earthly bodies are of five sorts [see body]. The organ of smell is terreous. Unorganic masses are stones, lumps of clay, &c. The union of integrant parts is hard, soft, or cumulative, as stones, flowers, cotton, &c.

2. Water, which has the qualities of earth ; excepting smell, and with the addition of viscosity. Odour, when observable in water, is adscititious, arising from mixture of earthy particles.

The distinguishing quality of water is coolness. It is accordingly defined as a substance cool to the feel.

It is eternal as atoms ; transient as aggregates. The qualities of the first are constant likewise ; those of the latter inconstant.

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\* *Can.* 1. 1. 4. 1. *Cés.* and *Com. Pad. Díp.*

† *Can.* 2. 1. 1. 1.

Organic aqueous bodies are beings abiding in the realm of VARUNA. The organ of taste is aqueous : witness the saliva. Unorganic waters are rivers, seas, rain, snow, hail, &c.

It is by some maintained, that hail is pure water rendered solid by super-vention of an unseen virtue : others imagine its solidity to be owing to mixture of earthy particles.

3. Light is coloured, and illumines other substances ; and to the feel, is hot : which is its distinguishing quality. It is defined as a substance hot to the feel. [Heat, then, and light, are identified as one substance.]

It has the qualities of earth, except smell, taste, and gravity. It is eternal, as atoms ; not so, as aggregates.

Organic luminous bodies are beings abiding in the solar realm. The visual ray, which is the organ of sight, is lucid [see organs of perception]. Unorganic light is reckoned fourfold : earthy, celestial, alvine, and mineral. Another distinction concerns sight and feel ; as light or heat may be either latent or manifest, in respect of both sight and feel, or differently in regard to either. Thus fire is both seen and felt ; the heat of hot water is felt, but not seen ; moonshine is seen, but not felt ; the visual ray is neither seen nor felt. Terrestrious light is that, of which the fuel is earthy, as fire. Celestial is that, of which the fuel is watery, as lightning, and meteors of various sorts. Alvine is that, of which the fuel is both earthy and watery : it is intestinal, which digests food and drink. Mineral is that, which is found in pits, as gold. For some maintain that gold is solid light ; or, at least that the chief ingredient is light, which is rendered solid by mixture with some particles of earth. Were it mere earth, it might be calcined by fire strongly urged. Its light is not latent, but overpowered by the colour of the earthy particles mixed with it. In the *Mímánsá*, however, it is reckoned a distinct substance, as before observed.

4. Air is a colourless substance, sensible to the feel : being temperate (neither hot, nor cold). Besides this its distinguishing quality, it has the same common qualities with light, except fluidity (that is, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, subsequence, and faculty of elasticity and velocity).

Its existence, as a distinct substance, is inferred from feeling. The wind, that blows, is apprehended as temperate, independently of the influence of light : and this temperature, which is a quality, implies a substratum ; for it cannot subsist without one : that substratum is air ; different from

water, which is cold ; and from light, which is hot ; and from earth, which is adventitiously warm by induction of light.

Air is either eternal as atoms, or transient as aggregates. Organic aerial bodies are beings inhabiting the atmosphere, and evil spirits (*Pisáchas*, &c.) who haunt the earth. The organ of touch is an aerial integument, or air diffused over the cuticle. Unorganic air is wind which agitates trees and other tremulous objects. To these may be added, as a fourth kind of aerial aggregates, the breath and other vital airs.

5. Ether (*ácáśa*), which is a substance that has the quality of sound. Besides that its peculiar and distinguishing quality, it has number (*viz.* unity), quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction. It is infinite, one, and eternal.

The existence of an ethereal element as a distinct substance, is deduced, not from distinct perception, but from inference. Sound is a peculiar quality: for, like colour and other peculiar qualities, it is apprehended by only one external organ of such beings as men are: now a quality abides in a substance which is qualified: but neither soul, nor any one of the four elements, earth, water, light, and air, can be its substratum, for it is apprehended by the organ of hearing; the qualities of earth, and the rest, are not apprehended by the hearing, but sound is; therefore it is not a quality of those substances; nor is it a quality of time, space, and mind; since it is a peculiar quality; and those three substances have none but such as are common to many: therefore a substratum, other than all these, is inferred; and that substratum is the ethereal element. It is one; for there is no evidence of diversity; and its unity is congruous, as infinity accounts for ubiquity. It is infinite, because it is in effect found every where. It is eternal, because it is infinite.

It appears white, from connexion with a lucid white orb; as a rock chrystal appears red by association with a red object. The blue colour of a clear sky is derived, according to PATANJALI, from the southern peak of the great mountain *Suméru*, which is composed of sapphire. On other sides of *Suméru*, the colour of the sky is different, being borrowed from the hue of the peak which overlooks that quarter. Others suppose, that the black colour of the pupil of the eye is imparted to the sky (blue and black being reckoned tinges of the same colour), as a jaundiced eye sees every object yellow.

The organ of hearing is ethereal, being a portion of ether (*ácáśa*) confined

in the hollow of the ear, and (as affirmed by the author of the *Padārt'ha Dīpikā*) endued with a particular and unseen virtue. In the ear of a deaf man, the portion of ether, which is there present, is devoid of that particular virtue ; and therefore it is not a perfect and efficient auditory organ.

6. Time is inferred from the relation of priority and subsequence, other than that of place. It is deduced from the notions of quick, slow, simultaneous, &c., and is marked by association of objects with the sun's revolutions.

Young is the reverse of old, as old is of young. This contrast, which does not concern place, is an effect, needing a cause, other than place, &c. That cause is time.

It has the qualities of number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction. It is one, eternal, infinite.

Though one, it takes numerous designations, as past, present, and future, with reference to acts that are so.

7. Place, or space, is inferred from the relation of priority and subsequence, other than that of time. It is deduced from the notions of *here* and *there*.

It has the same common qualities as time ; and like it, is one, eternal, infinite.

Though one, it receives various designations, as east, west, north, south, &c. by association with the sun's position.

8. Soul, though immaterial, is considered to be a substance, as a substratum of qualities. It is eighth in CANÁDE's arrangement. In GÓTAMA's it is first among things to be proven [see before].

9. Mind, according to CANÁDE, is a ninth substance ; and, in GÓTAMA's arrangement, it recurs in two places, as one of the twelve matters to be proven ; and again, under the distinct head of organs of sensation, being reckoned an internal sense [see before].

Material substances, are by CANÁDE considered to be primarily atoms ; and secondarily, aggregates. He maintains the eternity of atoms ; and their existence and aggregation are explained as follows :\*

The mote, which is seen in a sun-beam, is the smallest perceptible quantity. Being a substance, and an effect, it must be composed of what is less

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\* *Can. 2. 2. 2. 1. Cés'. &c.*

than itself; and this likewise is a substance and an effect; for the component part of a substance that has magnitude, must be an effect. This again must be composed of what is smaller; and that smaller thing is an atom. It is simple and uncomposed; else the series would be endless: and, were it pursued indefinitely, there would be no difference of magnitude between a mustard-seed and a mountain, a gnat and an elephant, each alike containing an infinity of particles. The ultimate atom then is simple.

The first compound consists of two atoms; for one does not enter into composition; and there is no argument to prove, that more than two must, for incohesion, be united. The next consists of three double atoms; for, if only two were conjoined, magnitude would hardly ensue, since it must be produced either by size or number of particles; it cannot be their size, and therefore, it must be their number. Nor is there any reason for assuming the union of four double atoms, since three suffice to originate magnitude.\* The atom then is reckoned to be the sixth part of a mote visible in a sun-beam.†

Two earthly atoms, concurring by an unseen peculiar virtue, the creative will of God, or time, or other competent cause, constitute a double atom of earth; and, by concourse of three binary atoms, a tertiary atom is produced; and, by concourse of four triple atoms, a quaternary atom; and so on, to a gross, grosser, or grossest mass of earth: thus great earth is produced; and in like manner, great water, from aqueous atoms; great light, from luminous; and great air, from aerial. The qualities, that belong to the effect, are those which appertained to the integrant part, or primary particle, as its material cause: and conversely, the qualities, which belong to the cause, are found in the effect.

The dissolution of substances proceeds inversely. In the integrant parts of an aggregate substance resulting from composition, as in the potsherds of an earthen jar, action is induced by pressure attended with velocity, or by simple pressure. Disjunction ensues; whereby the union, which was the cause of incohesion of members, is annulled; and the integral substance, consisting of those members, is resolved into its parts, and is destroyed: for it ceases to subsist as a whole.

II. Quality is closely united with substance; not, however, as an in-

\* *Cés.*

† *Pad. Díp.*

timate cause of it, nor consisting in motion ; but common : not a genus, yet appertaining to one. It is independent of conjunction and disjunction ; not the cause of them, nor itself endued with qualities.

Twenty-four are enumerated. Seventeen only are, indeed, specified in CANÁDE's aphorisms ;\* but the rest are understood.

1. Colour. It is a peculiar quality to be apprehended only by sight ; and abides in three substances ; earth, water, and light. It is a characteristic quality of the last ; and, in that, is white and resplendent. In water it is white, but without lustre. In the primary atoms of both, it is perpetual ; in their products, not so. In earth it is variable ; and seven colours are distinguished : *viz.* white, yellow, green, red, black, tawny (or orange),† and variegated. The varieties of these seven colours are many, unenumerated. The six simple colours occur in the atoms of earth ; and the seven, including variegated, in its double atoms, and more complex forms. The colour of integrant parts is the cause of colour in the integral substance.

2. Savour. It is a peculiar quality, to be apprehended only by the organ of taste ; and abides in two substances, earth and water. It is a characteristic quality of the last ; and in it is sweet. It is perpetual in atoms of water ; not so in aqueous products. In earth it is variable ; and six sorts are distinguished : sweet, bitter, pungent, astringent, acid, and saline.

3. Odour. It is a peculiar quality, to be apprehended only by the organ of smell ; and abides in earth alone, being its distinguishing quality. In water, odour is adscititious, being induced by union with earthy particles ; as a clear crystal appears red by association with a hollyhock, or other flower of that hue. In air also it is adscititious : thus a breeze, which has blown over blossoms, musk, camphor, or other scented substances, wafts fragrant particles of the blossoms, &c. The flowers are not torn, nor the musk diminished, because the parts are replaced by a reproductive unseen virtue. However, camphor and other volatile substances do waste.

Two sorts of odour are distinguished, fragrance and stench.

4. Feel, and especially temperature. It is a peculiar quality, to be apprehended only by the skin or organ of feeling. It abides in four substances ; earth, water, light, and air ; and is a characteristic quality of the last.

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\* *Can.* 1. 1. 2. 2. and 1. 1. 4. 2.

† One commentator (*Múdh.*) specifies blue in place of orange ; another (*Gau.*) omits both, reducing the colours to six.



Three sorts are distinguished, cold, hot, and temperate. In water, it is cold ; in light, hot ; in earth and in air, temperate. Divers other sorts, likewise, are noticed ; as hard and soft, and diversified, &c.

These four qualities are latent in minute substances, as atoms and double atoms ; manifest to perception in products or aggregates of greater magnitude. A mote in a sunbeam may be seen, though not felt. The colour of the visual ray, or organ of sight, is ordinarily imperceptible.

5. Number. It is the reason of perceiving and reckoning one, two, or many, to the utmost limit of numeration. The notion of number is deduced from comparison. Of two masses seen, this is one, and that is one : hence the notion of two, and so of more.

It is an universal quality ; common to all substances, without exception.

It is considered to be of two sorts, unity and multitude ; or of three, monad, duad, and multitude. Unity is either eternal or transient : eternal unity regards eternal things : that, which is uneternal, concerns effects or transitory substances.

6. Quantity. It is the special cause of the use and perception of measure.

It is an universal quality, common to all substances.

It is considered to be fourfold : great and small ; long and short.

Extreme littleness and shortness are eternal ; as mind, or as atoms, whether single or double, &c. Extreme length and greatness (termed infinite) are likewise eternal, as ether.

Within these extremes is inferior magnitude or finite quantity : which is uneternal. It is of various degrees in length and bulk, more or most, from the mote or tertiary atom, upwards, to any magnitude short of infinite.

The finite magnitude of products or effects results from number, size, or mass. Multitude of atoms, bulk of particles, and heap of component parts, constitute magnitude. The latter, or cumulation of particles, concerns a loose texture. The others, close or compact.

Infinity transcends the senses. An object may be too great, as it may be too small, to be distinguished.

7. Individuality, severalty, or separateness, is a quality common to all substances.

It is of two sorts ; individuality of one or of a pair ; or it is manifold, as individuality of a triad, &c. Simple individuality is eternal, in respect of eternal things ; transient, in regard to such as are transitory. Individuality

of a pair or triad, &c. is of course transitory : it results from comparison, as duad or triad does.

8. Conjunction is a transient connexion.

It is an universal quality, incident to all substances ; and is transitory.

It implies two subjects, and is threefold : arising from the act of either or of both, or else from conjunction ; being simple, or reciprocal, or mediate. The junction of a falcon perching, which is active, with the perch whereon it settles, which is passive, is conjunction arising from the act of one. Collision of fighting rams, or of wrestlers, is conjunction arising from the act of both. Contact of a finger with a tree occasions the conjunction of the body with the tree ; and this is mediate.

9. Disjunction. It is the converse of conjunction ; necessarily preceded by it, and, like it, implying two subjects. It is not the mere negation of conjunction, nor simply the dissolution of it.

The knowledge of this quality, as well as of its counterpart, is derived from perception.

It is an universal quality, incident to all substances ; and is simple, reciprocal, or mediate. A falcon, taking flight from a rock, is an instance of disjunction arising from the act of one of two subjects : the active from the inactive. The parting of combatants, rams or wrestlers, is an example of disjunction arising from the act of both. Disjunction of the body and the tree, resulting from the disunion of the finger and the tree, is mediate.

10.—11. Priority and posteriority. These qualities, being contrasted and correlative, are considered together. They are of two sorts, concerning place and time. In respect of place, they are proximity and distance ; in regard to time, youth and antiquity. The one concerns (*mūrta*) definite bodies, consisting of circumscribed quantity ; the other affects generated substances.

The knowledge of them is derived from comparison.

Two masses being situated in one place, nearness is deduced from the conjunction of one with place as associated by comparison : referring primarily to the person of the spectator ; or, secondarily, to other correlatives of place. Where least conjunction of conjunct things intervenes, it is nearness ; where most does, it is remoteness. Thus, *Prayāga* is nearer to *Mat'hurā*, than *Cási* ; and *Cási* remoter from it, than *Prayāga*.

In like manner, one of two masses, not restricted to place, is young, as deduced from the association of the object with time, by comparison dis-

criminating that which is connected with least time. Another is old, which is connected with most time. Here time is determined by revolutions of the sun.

12. Gravity is the peculiar cause of primary descent or falling.\*

It affects earth and water. Gold is affected by this quality, by reason of earth contained in it.

In the absence of a countervailing cause, as adhesion, velocity, or some act of volition, descent results from this quality. Thus a cocoa-nut is withheld from falling by adhesion of the foot-stalk; but, this impediment ceasing on maturity of the fruit, it falls.

According to UDAYANA A'CHÁRYA, gravity is imperceptible, but to be inferred from the act of falling. BALLABHA maintains, that it is perceived in the position of a thing descending to a lower situation.

Levity is not a distinct quality; but the negation of gravity. ^

13. Fluidity is the cause of original trickling.†

It affects earth, light, and water. It is natural and essential in water; adscititious in earth and light; being induced by exhibition of fire in molten substances, as lac, gold, &c.

Fluidity is perceptible by the external senses, sight and touch.

In hail and ice, fluidity essentially subsists, but is obstructed by an impediment arising from an unseen virtue, which renders the water solid.

14. Viscidity is the quality of clamminess, and cause of agglutination. It abides in water only. In oil, liquid butter, &c., it results from the watery parts of those liquids.‡

15. Sound is a peculiar quality of the ethereal element; and is to be apprehended by the hearing. It abides in that element exclusively, and is its characteristic quality. Two sorts are distinguished: articulate and musical.§

To account for sound originating in one place, being heard in another, it is observed, that sound is propagated by undulation; wave after wave; radiating in every direction, from a centre, like the blossoms of a Nauclea. It is not the first, nor the intermediate wave, that is the sound heard: but the last which comes in contact with the organ of hearing: and therefore it is not quite correct to say, that a drum has been heard. Sound origi-

\* *Tarc. Bhāsh.* and *Pad. Dīp.*

† *Ibid.* and *Siddh. Sang.*

‡ *Ibid.*

§ *Ibid.* and *Gau. &c.*

nates in conjunction, in disjunction, or in sound itself. The conjunction of cymbals, or that of a drum and stick, may serve to exemplify the first. It is the instrumental cause. The rustling of leaves is an instance of disjunction being the cause of sound. In some cases, sound becomes the cause of sound. In all, the conformity of wind, or its calmness, is a concomitant cause: for an adverse wind obstructs it. The material cause is in every case the etherial fluid: and the conjunction of that with the sonorous subject, is a concomitant cause.

The *Mimánsá* affirms the eternity of sound. This is contested by the *Naiyáyikas*, who maintain, that were it eternal, it could not be apprehended by human organs of sense.

16.—23. The eight following qualities are perceptible by the mental organ; not by the external senses. They are qualities of the soul, not of material substances.

16 Intelligence (*budd'hi*) is placed by CANÁDE among qualities; and by GÓTAMA, fifth among objects of proof. It will be noticed in that place.

17 and 18. Pleasure and pain are among qualities enumerated by CANÁDE. Pain or evil is placed by GÓTAMA among objects of proof: where (under the head of deliverance) it will be further noticed, with its converse.

19 and 20. Desire and aversion are the two next in order among qualities. Desire is the wish of pleasure and of happiness, and of absence of pain. Passion is extreme desire: it is incident to man and inferior beings. The supreme being is devoid of passion. Neither does desire intend God's will, nor a saint's wish. Aversion is loathing or hatred.

21. Volition (*yatna*), effort, or exertion, is a determination to action productive of gratification. Desire is its occasion, and perception its reason. Two sorts of perceptible effort are distinguished: that proceeding from desire, seeking what is agreeable; and that which proceeds from aversion, shunning what is loathsome. Another species, which escapes sensation or perception, but is inferred from analogy of spontaneous acts, comprises animal functions, having for a cause the vital unseen power.

Volition, desire, and intelligence, are in man transitory, variable, or inconstant. The will and intelligence of God are eternal, uniform, constant.

22 and 23. Virtue and vice (*D'harma* and *Ad'harma*), or moral merit and demerit, are the peculiar causes of pleasure and of pain respectively. The result of performing that which is enjoined, as sacrifice, &c. is virtue: the

result of doing that which is forbidden, is vice. They are qualities of the soul ; imperceptible, but inferred from reasoning.

The proof of them is deduced from transmigration. The body of an individual, with his limbs and organs of sense, is a result of a peculiar quality of his soul ; since this is the cause of that individual's fruition, like a thing which is produced by his effort or volition. The peculiar quality of the soul, which does occasion its being invested with body, limbs, and organs, is virtue or vice : for body and the rest are not the result of effort and volition.\*

24. The twenty-fourth and last quality is faculty (*sanscára*). This comprehends three sorts.

Velocity (*véga*), which is the cause of action. It concerns matter only ; and is a quality of the mental organ, and of the four grosser elements, earth, water, light, and air. It becomes manifest from the perception of motion.

Elasticity (*st'hitist'hávaca*) is a quality of particular tangible, terrene objects ; and is the cause of that peculiar action, whereby an altered thing is restored to its pristine state ; as a bow unbends, and a strained branch resumes its former position. It is imperceptible ; but is inferred from the fact of the restitution of a thing to its former condition.

Imagination (*bhávana*) is a peculiar quality of the soul, and is the cause of memory. It is a result of notion or recollection ; and being excited, produces remembrance : and the exciting cause is the recurrence of an association ; that is, of the sight or other perception of a like object.

III. The next head in CANÁDE'S arrangement, after quality, is action (*carme*).

Action consists in motion, and, like quality, abides in substance alone. It affects a single, that is, a finite substance, which is matter. It is the cause (not aggregative, but indirect) of disjunction, as of conjunction : that is, a fresh conjunction in one place, after annulment of a prior one in another, by means of disjunction. It is devoid of quality ; and is transitory.

Five sorts are enumerated : to cast upward ; to cast downward ; to push

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\* *Tarc. Bhásh.*

forward ; to spread horizontally ; and, fifthly, to go : including many varieties under the last comprehensive head.

IV. Community (*sámánya*), or the condition of equal or like things, is the cause of the perception of conformity. It is eternal, single, concerning more than one thing, being a property common to several. It abides in substance, in quality, and in action.

Two degrees of it are distinguished : the highest, concerning numerous objects ; the lowest, concerning few. The first is existence, a common property of all. The latter, is the abstraction of an individual, varying with age, in dimensions, yet continuing identical. A third, or intermediate degree, is distinguished, comprehended in the first, and including the latter. These three degrees of community correspond nearly with genus, species, and individual.

In another view, community is two fold : *viz.* genus (*jāti*) and discriminative property (*upādhi*), or species.

The *Baudd'has* are cited as denying this category, and maintaining that individuals only have existence ; and that abstraction is false and deceptive. This, as well as other controverted points, will be further noticed at a future opportunity.

V. Difference (*viśésha*), or particularity, is the cause of perception of exclusion. It affects a particular and single object, which is devoid of community. It abides in eternal substances. Such substances are mind, soul, time, place ; and the etherial element ; and the atoms of earth, water, light, and air.

VI. The sixth and last of CANÁDE's categories is aggregation (*samaváya*), or perpetual intimate relation. It has been already briefly noticed.

VII. To the six affirmative categories of CANÁDE, succeeding writers add a seventh, which is negative.

Negation or privation (*abháva*) is of two sorts ; universal and mutual. Universal negation comprehends three species, antecedent, emergent, and absolute.

Antecedent privation (*prágabháva*) is present negation of that, which, at a future time, will be. It is negation in the material cause, previous to the

production of an effect; as, in yarn, prior to the fabrication of cloth, there is antecedent privation of the piece of cloth which is to be woven. It is without beginning, for it has not been produced; and has an end, for it will be terminated by the production of the effect.

Emergent privation is destruction (*dhwansa*), or cessation, of an effect. It is negation in the cause, subsequent to the production of the effect: as, in a broken jar (smashed by the blow of a mallet) the negation of jar in the heap of potsherds. It has a commencement, but no end; for the destruction of the effect cannot be undone.

Absolute negation extends through all times, past, present, and future. It has neither beginning nor end. For example, fire in a lake, colour in air.

Mutual privation is difference (*bhēda*). It is reciprocal negation of identity, essence, or respective peculiarity.

5. To return to GÓTAMA's arrangement. The fifth place, next after objects of sense, is by him allotted to intelligence (*budd'hi*), apprehension, knowledge, or conception; defined as that which manifests, or makes known, a matter.

It is two-fold: notion, and remembrance. Notion (*anubhava*) includes two sorts: right and wrong. Right notion (*pramā*) is such as is incontrovertible. It is derived from proof, and is consequently fourfold; *viz.* from perception; or inference; or comparison; or revelation: for example: 1st. a jar perceived by undisordered organs; 2d. fire inferred from smoke; 3d. a gayal \* recognised from its resemblance to a cow; 4th. celestial happiness attainable through sacrifice, as inculcated by the *Vēdas*.

Wrong notion deviates from truth, and is not derived from proof. It is threefold: doubt; premises liable to reduction to absurdity; and error (for example, mistaking mother-o'-pearl for silver).

Remembrance (*smaraṇa*), likewise, is either right or wrong. Both occur, and right remembrance especially, while awake. But, in sleep, remembrance is wrong.

6. The sixth place among objects of proof, is allotted to mind. It has been already twice noticed; *viz.* among organs of sense, and again among substances.

- 7. Activity (*pravṛitti*) is next in order. It is determination, the result

\* *Bos gavæus s. frontalis.* *As. Res.* 8. 487. Linn. Trans.

of passion, and the cause of virtue and vice, or merit and demerit; according as the act is one enjoined or forbidden. It is oral, mental, or corporeal; not comprehending unconscious vital functions. It is the reason of all wordly proceedings.

8. From acts proceed faults (*dósha*): including, under this designation, passion or extreme desire; aversion or loathing; and error or delusion (*móha*). The two first of these are reckoned by CANÁDE among qualities.

9. Next in GÓTAMA's arrangement is (*prétya-bháva*) the condition of the soul after death; which is transmigration: for the soul, being immortal, passes from a former body which perishes, to a new one which receives it. This is a reproduction (*punar-utpatti*).

10. Retribution (*phala*) is the fruit accruing from faults which result from activity. It is a return of fruition (*punar-bhóga*), or experience of pleasure or pain, in association with body, mind, and senses.

11. Pain, or anguish, is the eleventh topic of matters to be proven.

12. Deliverance from pain is beatitude: it is absolute prevention of every sort of ill; reckoned, in this system of philosophy, to comprehend twenty-one varieties of evil, primary or secondary: *viz.* 1. body; 2—7. the six organs of sense; 8—13. six objects (*vishaya*) of sensation; 14—19. six sorts of apprehension and intelligence (*budd'hi*); 20. pain or anguish; 21. pleasure. For even this, being tainted with evil, is pain; as honey drugged with poison is reckoned among deleterious substances.

This liberation from ill is attained by soul, acquainted with the truth (*tatwa*), by means of holy science; divested of passion through knowledge of the evil incident to objects; meditating on itself; and, by the maturity of self-knowledge, making its own essence present; relieved from impediments; not earning fresh merit or demerit, by deeds done with desire; discerning the previous burden of merit or demerit, by devout contemplation; and acquitting it through compressed endurance of its fruit; and thus, (previous acts being annulled, and present body departed, and no future body accruing,) there is no further connexion with the various sorts of ill, since there is no cause for them. This, then, is prevention of pain of every sort; it is deliverance, and beatitude.

III. After proof and matter to be proven, GÓTAMA proceeds to other categories; and assigns the next place to doubt (*sansáya*).

It is the consideration of divers contrary matters, in regard to one and



the same thing ; and is of three sorts, arising from common or from peculiar qualities ; or merely from contradiction : discriminative marks being in all three cases unnoticed. Thus an object is observed, concerning which it becomes a question whether it be a man or a post : the limbs which would betoken the man, or the crooked trunk which would distinguish the post, being equally unperceived. Again, odour is a peculiar quality of earth : it belongs not to eternal substances, as the ethereal element ; nor to transient elements, as water : is then earth eternal or uneternal ? So, one affirms that sound is eternal ; another denies that position ; and a third person doubts.

IV. Motive (*prayôjana*) is that by which a person is actuated, or moved to action. It is the desire of attaining pleasure, or of shunning pain ; or the wish of exemption from both : for such is the purpose or impulse of every one in a natural state of mind.\*

V. Instance (*drishtëanta*) is, in a controversy, a topic on which both disputants consent. It is either concordant or discordant ; direct or inverse : as the culinary hearth, for a direct instance of the argument of the presence of fire betokened by smoke ; and a lake, for an inverse or contrary instance of the argument, where the indicating vapour is mist or fog.†

VI. Demonstrated truth (*siddhânta*) is of four sorts ; viz. universally acknowledged ; partially so ; hypothetically ; argumentatively (or, *e concessu*).‡

Thus, existence of substance, or of that to which properties appertain, is universally recognised ; though the abstract notion of it may not be so ; for the *Bauddhas* deny abstraction. Mind is by the *Naiyâyikas* considered to be an organ of perception ; and so it is by the kindred sect of *Vaiśēshikas*. The eternity of sound is admitted in the *Mīmāṃsā*, and denied in the *Nyāya*. Supposing the creation of the earth to be proved, omniscience of the creator follows. In JAṬMINI's disquisition on the eternity, or the transitoriness, of sound, it is said, granting sound to be a quality.

\* Gôt. 1. 1. 4. 1—3.

† Gôt. 1. 1. 5. 1—6.

‡ Gôt. 1. 1. 6. 1. &amp;c.

On the appositeness of some of these examples, in the cases to which they are here applied, as instances of divers sorts of demonstration, there is a disagreement among commentators, which it is needless to go into.

VII. A regular argument, or complete syllogism (*nyāya*), consists of five members (*avayava*) or component parts. 1st. the proposition (*pratijnyā*); 2d. the reason (*hétu* or *apadéśa*); 3d. the instance (*udúharaña* or *midarśana*); 4th. the application (*upanaya*); 5th. the conclusion (*nigamana*). Ex.

1. This hill is fiery :
2. For it smokes.
3. What smokes, is fiery : as a culinary hearth.
4. Accordingly the hill is smoking :
5. Therefore it is fiery.

Some \* confine the syllogism (*nyāya*) to three members ; either the three first, or the three last. In this latter form it is quite regular. The recital joined with the instance is the major ; the application is the minor ; the conclusion follows.

VIII. Next, in this arrangement, is (*tarca*) reduction to absurdity. It is a mode of reasoning, for the investigation of truth, by deduction from wrong premises, to an inadmissible conclusion which is at variance with proof, whether actual perception or demonstrable inference. The conclusion, to which the premises would lead, is inadmissible, as contrary to what is demonstrated, or as conceding what is disproved.

It is not to be confounded with doubt, to which there are two sides ; but to this there is but one.

Five sorts are distinguished by the more ancient writers, to which the moderns have added six, or even seven more varieties. It is needless to enumerate them : one or two examples may suffice.

Ex. 1. Is this hill fiery, or not ? On this question one delivers his opinion, that it is not fiery. The answer to him is, Were it not fiery, it would not smoke.

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\* The followers of the *Mīmāṃsā*. *Pad. Dīp.*

Ex. 2. If there be a jar in this place, it must look like the ground.

Fallacy of the same form, termed *tarcābhāsa*, comprises the like number of sorts and varieties.

The designations, by which they are distinguished, are familiar to the Indian scholastic disputation. It would be tedious to enumerate and explain them.

IX. Ascertainment (*nirnéya*), or determination of truth, is the fruit of proof, the result of evidence and of reasoning, confuting objections, and establishing the position in question.

X.—XII. Disputation (*cat'hā*) is conference, or dialogue of interlocutors, maintaining adverse positions; whether contending for victory, or seeking the truth. It comprises three of the categories.

X. One is (*jalpa*) debate of disputants contending for victory: each seeking to establish his own position, and overthrow the opponent's.

XI. Another is (*vāda*) discourse, or interlocution of persons communing on a topic in pursuit of truth, as preceptor and pupil together with fellow-students.

XII. The third is (*vitānda*) cavil, or controversy wherein the disputant seeks to confute his opponent, without offering to support a position of his own.

XIII. Next in GÓTAMA's enumeration is fallacy, or, as it is termed, semblance of a reason (*hétwābhāsa*); it is the *non causa pro causa* of logicians. Five sorts are distinguished, embracing divers varieties or subdivisions. They need not be here set forth.

XIV. Fraud (*ch'hala*), or perversion and misconstruction, is of three sorts: 1st. verbal misconstruing of what is ambiguous; 2d. perverting, in a literal sense, what is said in a metaphorical one; 3d. generalizing what is particular.

XV. After all these is (*jāti*) a futile answer, or self-confuting reply. No less than twenty-four sorts are enumerated.

XVI. The sixteenth and last of GÓTAMA's categories, is (*nigraha-s't'hána*) failure in argument, or (*parájaya-hétu*) reason of defeat. It is the termination of a controversy. Of this, likewise, no fewer than twenty-two distinctions are specified: which are here passed by; as the present essay has already been extended to too great a length.